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Introduction 
Paying for health reform will be one of the most 
challenging tasks facing the Congress. Providing 
universal coverage through a combination of 
Medicaid expansions and income-related 
subsidies could cost over $1.5 trillion dollars over 
10 years, depending on how the plan is structured. 
Several ideas for financing health reform have 
been proposed, but all seem to generate 
opposition from some quarter. Similarly, 
proposals to reduce or contain costs impact 
provider revenues and are generally opposed by 
those who are affected. Other proposals such as 
greater use of health information technology, the 
use of medical homes and chronic care 
management programs suffer from limited 
evidence on their effectiveness at restraining 
spending. 
 In this paper, we argue that there are many 
realistic sources of savings and many sources of 
revenue that could be used to support health 
reform. In some cases, policy initiatives plausibly 
would improve quality and patient experience 
with care while reducing spending. However, all 
of the measures could negatively affect some 
stakeholders financially and will likely be 
opposed by them because of that. Nevertheless, 
health reform will only happen if we are willing to 
take advantage of a variety of savings 
opportunities and revenue sources, thus spreading 
the costs broadly and minimizing burden on any 
single group. In this paper we show that it is 
possible to obtain more than enough savings or 
revenue to fully finance comprehensive health 
care reform.  
In delineating an array of savings and 
financing strategies, we assume a health reform 
approach consistent with the broad outlines being 
actively considered by Congress and the Obama 
administration. The plan would have a Medicaid 
expansion for all those with incomes less than 100 
percent of the federal poverty level; those 
currently on Medicaid and CHIP with higher 
incomes would obtain coverage in the new health 
insurance exchange (described below). There 
would be an individual mandate for all individuals 
to obtain health insurance coverage. The plan 
would have an insurance exchange offering 
private health insurance plans to individual and 
small employer purchasers (fewer than 50 
workers).1  
There would be income-related subsidies for 
families up to 400 percent of the federal poverty 
level obtaining coverage through exchanges 
plans.2 For those with incomes below 400 percent 
of the poverty level, the government pays the 
difference between the premium and a specified 
percent of income. Consequently, strategies that 
would lower the premiums will reduce the cost of 
government subsidies.3  
We assume that the net costs of the Medicaid 
expansion are fully borne by the federal 
government4 and would increase net federal 
Medicaid spending by $42.7 billion in 2010. Over 
10 years net federal Medicaid spending would 
increase by an estimated $550 billion.5 We 
estimate the cost of subsidies to be $1.26 trillion 
over 10 years if no public plan option is included 
in the exchange, only private plans being offered. 
The costs shown in table 1 reflect these 
government obligations. As a whole, we estimate 
that this hypothetical plan would cost $1.81 
trillion. This would extend coverage to all except 
undocumented immigrants and assumes 
instantaneous implementation in 2010; in other 
words, we do not have low early-year costs 
because of a phase-in process. Costs would be 
lower if the mandate is not fully effective, or if 
subsidies or benefits are less generous.  
In this paper, we describe a range of policies 
that could reduce health care spending, both 
overall and for government. We examine a 
number of options that would generate savings to 
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 Table 1
Health Care Reform Budget
(billions  of dollars)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2010-2019
Medicaid Expansion (Net) 42.7 44.8 47.0 49.4 52.2 55.4 58.9 62.6 66.6 70.8 550.4
Baseline Subsidies 97.6 102.2 107.2 112.8 119.3 126.5 134.5 143.0 152.0 161.6 1,256.6
(No savings from Public Plan)
Total Reform Spending 140.3 147.0 154.2 162.3 171.5 182.0 193.4 205.6 218.6 232.3 1,807.1
the government by reducing provider payments 
within the Medicare program.  
We first examine the cost savings from 
reducing payments to Medicare and Medicaid. 
These include 
• reducing the pricing advantage of Medicare 
Advantage plans,  
• reducing prices of selected physician 
services,  
• reducing payment rates to hospitals and 
post-acute care providers, and 
• reducing funds that currently go to safety 
net providers (most of which would not be 
needed if we had universal coverage), 
We then examine a set of delivery system 
reforms. The cost estimates for these are more 
questionable but we make the argument that the 
research evidence supports assumptions of some 
savings for several of these measures and that, 
taken together, they can make an important 
contribution. We recognize that significant 
commitment is required on the part of the federal 
government to make these initiatives successful. 
These are 
• investing in chronic care management and 
coordination programs,  
• reducing hospital payments for 
readmissions within 15 days,  
• addressing health spending at the end of 
life,  
• introducing a prevention program targeted 
at preventing diabetes and hypertension,  
• adoption of health information technology,  
• malpractice reform,  
• increased health system reliance on primary 
care/medical homes, 
• comparative effectiveness/public- and 
private-payer coverage of new 
technologies. 
Next we estimate the savings that could 
result from providing a public insurance plan 
option in the health insurance exchange. We 
estimate significant savings from introducing 
such an option, which would provide the 
advantage of somewhat lower administrative 
costs and provider payment rates between current 
Medicare and private insurance levels. 
Finally, we examine a number of options for 
raising revenues: 
• revenues that would come from an 
assessment on employers with 10 or more 
workers who do not provide health 
insurance coverage to their workers,  
• a revenue increase from capping the current 
income and payroll tax exclusions of 
employer contributions to health insurance, 
and finally  
• the revenue possibilities from sin taxes and 
selective increases in federal income taxes. 
Estimates for the health system options are 
provided in table 2.  
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 Table 2
Health Reform Savings
(billions  of dollars)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2010-2019
Reductions in Payments to Medicare and Medicaid
Establish Competitive Bidding for Medicare Advantage Programa 4.4 8.9 11.3 12.1 13.0 14.1 15.2 16.6 18.0 19.4 133.0
Savings from Reduction in Payments for Overpriced Services 4.3 6.5 6.9 7.4 7.8 8.3 8.8 9.4 10.0 10.6 80.0
Reductions in Other Medicare Payments
Reduce Update Factor for Hospitals’ Inpatient Operating 
Paymentsb 0.0 1.5 3.1 5.0 7.0 9.2 11.7 14.7 18.2 22.4 92.9
Reduce Update Factor for Payments to Post-Acute Care 
Providersb 0.0 0.7 1.6 2.7 3.9 5.3 6.8 8.7 10.9 13.6 54.2
Reallocation of Safety Net Fundsc 21.0 22.1 23.2 24.3 25.5 26.8 28.1 29.5 31.0 32.6 264.1
Government Savings 29.8 39.6 46.1 51.5 57.3 63.7 70.8 78.9 88.1 98.6 624.2
Total Savings 29.8 39.6 46.1 51.5 57.3 63.7 70.8 78.9 88.1 98.6 624.2
Delivery System Reformsc
Savings from Chronic Disease Management for Dual Eligibles 14.2 15.1 16.1 17.3 18.6 20.1 21.8 23.7 25.7 27.8 200.5
Savings from Reducing Hospital Readmissions in Medicare and 
Medicaid 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.4 14.8
Savings from Improvements to End of Life Care for Medicare 
Benefic iaries 6.4 6.8 7.3 7.8 8.4 9.1 9.9 10.7 11.6 12.6 90.8
Savings from Prevention to Medicare and Medicaid, or Subsidy Cost 0.0 1.0 2.7 4.6 6.5 8.9 17.2 25.2 34.0 44.2 142.9
Additional Sav ings to Health Sys tem 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.5 2.2 3.0 5.7 8.4 11.3 14.7 48.1
Savings from Increased Use of HIT to Medicare and Medicaid, or 
Subsidy Cost 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 7.2 7.7 8.3 8.9 9.6 48.5
Additional Sav ings to Health Sys tem 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 7.2 7.7 8.3 8.9 9.6 48.5
Savings from Malpractice Reform to Medicare and Medicaid, or 
Subsidy Cost 9.6 10.1 10.7 11.4 12.2 13.0 13.9 15.0 16.0 17.2 129.2
Additional Sav ings to Health Sys tem 9.6 10.1 10.7 11.4 12.2 13.0 13.9 15.0 16.0 17.2 129.2
Increased Health System Reliance on Primary Care/Medical Homes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Comparative Effectiveness/Public and Private Payer Coverage of 
New Technology 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government Savings 30.3 33.1 38.3 42.7 54.1 60.1 72.4 84.9 98.5 113.7 626.8
Total Savings 39.9 43.6 49.9 55.6 75.1 83.3 99.8 116.5 134.8 155.3 852.6
a Ten year estimate from Congressional Budget Off ice. Information on the Options for the Medicare Advantage Program’s Benchmarks  for Federal Payments. Letter to the Honorable Mike Crapo. 2009 May 18. Individual year estimates were derived 
using the predicted growth rate of Medicare, assuming a three year phase-in period.
b The Congressional Budget Office, "Budget Options  Volume 1: Health Care," Decem ber 2008, Chapter 7, p.  108-109. 
c Research evidence and assumptions for these est im ates  are described in the text.  
Reducing Medicare and Medicaid Payments to 
Providers 
Payment Reductions for Medicare Advantage 
Plans 
Payments for Medicare Advantage (MA) plans 
are linked to benchmarks established by Medicare 
in each geographic area. The benchmark is the 
maximum amount set by law that Medicare can 
pay a MA Plan for Part A and Part B benefits. 
Plans bid to provide services to Medicare 
beneficiaries. If their bid is above the benchmark 
then Medicare will pay the plan a rate equal to the 
benchmark and the plan must collect the 
difference from enrollees. If the bid is below the 
benchmark the plan is paid its bid and 75 percent 
of the difference between the bid and the 
benchmark. The 75 percent must be returned to 
beneficiaries through lower premiums or greater 
benefits. The problem is that benchmarks are set 
well above traditional Medicare program’s 
average cost per beneficiary. As a result, MA 
payments are well in excess of both plan bids to 
provide the statutory Part A and Part B services 
and of traditional Medicare spending. Plans use 
the overpayments to provide additional benefits 
beyond statutorily mandated ones and for 
additional profits.  
MedPAC has estimated that payments to MA 
plans in 2009 are 114 percent of average fee for 
service program spending.6 MedPAC has argued 
that the Medicare program should pay the same 
amount for the same set of benefits across all 
options. Paying MA plans in the current system 
means higher cost to government and greater 
benefits to those who are in many of these plans 
than are available to other Medicare beneficiaries. 
MedPAC recommends payment neutrality 
between traditional Medicare and private plans, 
with the benchmarks for MA plans set at the level 
of spending in the traditional Medicare program.  
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 Recently, the CBO scored a specific option 
from MedPAC to set benchmarks equal to a blend 
of local average per capita spending (75 percent) 
and national average per capita spending in the 
fee-for-service program (25 percent). The CBO 
estimate would reduce federal spending by $133 
billion over the 2010-2019 period.7 
The Obama administration has proposed that 
there be a more market-oriented competitive 
bidding approach for Medicare Advantage plans, 
in which the benchmarks that determine the 
federal contribution are set as a function of the 
actual MA plan bids, rather than spending in the 
traditional Medicare program, as is true currently 
and as is the case in the MedPAC proposal. The 
CBO scored savings for this approach at $177 
billion over the same 10 year period. We question 
whether a national regime of competitive bidding 
only among MA plans, without reference to 
spending in traditional Medicare, is 
administratively feasible in the short term or 
politically likely. Accordingly, we assume the 
lower figure of $133 billion in our savings 
projections by adopting the administered pricing 
approach recommended by MedPAC (see table 2).  
Reducing Prices of Overpriced Physician 
Services  
Recent growth in Medicare expenditures on 
physician services is attributable to increasing 
utilization rather than rising physician fees. 
Spending on physician services per beneficiary 
grew by 45 percent between 2000 and 2006 while 
fees grew only 4.5 percent.8 In recent years, 
studies have documented that physician payment 
rates for many services under Medicare and 
commercial payer fee schedules are distorted in 
relation to the underlying costs of production. 
Distorted fees in turn may distort physician 
behavior, sometimes facilitated by the ability that 
many physicians have to self-refer. If fees were 
closer to underlying resource costs, there would 
be less financial incentive for self-referrals.9  
In recent years, growth in the number and 
intensity of services has been modest for major 
procedures and evaluation and management 
(E&M) services, higher for minor procedures and 
imaging, and highest for non-imaging tests.10 
Evidence suggests that the profitability of the 
fastest growing services tended to be relatively 
high, creating incentives for providers to develop 
clinical service lines in these areas and to promote 
the services to patients and referring physicians.11 
More beneficiaries are receiving care, more 
services are being provided per beneficiary, and 
the intensity of the services is increasing.  
Greater attention to setting fees to avoid 
distortions would reduce spending directly by 
reducing the payments for overpriced procedures 
and sometimes indirectly by reducing the 
incentives for physicians to self-refer for services 
of dubious appropriateness. There has been a long 
debate among health services researchers about 
whether physicians respond to fee cuts by 
increasing volume – the so-called “behavioral 
offset.” In fact, the evidence suggests that there is 
no simple physician behavioral response to fee 
cuts – it varies by procedure, specialty, baseline 
payment, and other factors. Volume may increase, 
stay the same, or decrease in response to payment 
changes.12  
In fact, one of the more successful cost-
containing initiatives Medicare has used in recent 
years was the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) 
limitation that office-based imaging services fees 
not exceed the prices used for reimbursement to 
outpatient hospitals. In the first year under the 
new pricing structure, overall costs of imaging in 
physicians’ offices were reduced by 13 percent.13 
But, importantly, the decreased costs resulted not 
only from the price reductions themselves but 
from a lower volume of imaging services; per-
beneficiary utilization of imaging services, which 
has been rising about 6 percent per year from 
2000 to 2006 continued to rise in 2007 but at 
about half the prior rate.  
Rather than rely on across-the-board fee cuts 
that would occur if the sustainable growth rate 
(SGR) imposed cuts were permitted to go into 
effect, the success of this DRA provision suggests 
that a more targeted approach to reducing 
payments for overvalued services could be 
successful. Medicare fee schedules could be 
modified to reduce payment distortions that result 
in overpayments. MedPAC has made a number of 
suggestions for reducing overreliance of CMS on 
the AMA’s Resource-Based Relative Value Scale 
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 Update Committee (RUC), which has had trouble 
identifying and reducing overvalued “work” 
associated with services within the Medicare Fee 
Schedule.14 Similarly, there are opportunities for 
CMS to more actively correct the distortions in 
the “practice expense” component of relative 
value units.15 CMS has recently promulgated 
proposed regulations that would begin correcting 
flaws in the practice expense calculations.16  
Increased administrative discretion and tools 
to identify and reduce (and selectively increase) 
service-specific valuations will allow CMS to 
make selective modifications of values rather than 
across-the-board reductions that treat all services 
the same. So, if there is evidence that a service is 
over-priced, its Medicare payment rate can be cut 
without necessarily increasing the rates for any 
other services. 
Commercial plans are not able to simply adopt 
the same pricing changes that Medicare adopts, 
even though most non-Medicare payers now use 
the Medicare Fee Schedule as the basis for their 
own fee schedules. On average, commercial plans 
pay physicians about 20 percent more than 
Medicare. Nevertheless, many commercial health 
plan executives agree that changes in the 
Medicare Fee Schedule to reduce payments for 
overpriced imaging, tests, and minor procedures 
would make it easier for them to reduce their own 
fees for these services. However, given 
uncertainty about whether commercial insurers 
and self-funded employers would be able to pass 
through reductions in overpriced services that 
Medicare can accomplish by changing its fee 
schedule, we do not assume additional savings on 
top of Medicare savings. 
The Obama administration has assumed that 
the sustainable growth rate (SGR) formula would 
be eliminated and replaced with an assumption of 
modest growth in physician payments over the 
next ten years. The cost of this increase is 
included in the administration’s budget. Last 
December, the CBO scored significant savings 
from an approach that would establish service-
specific updates for Medicare’s physician 
payment rates—essentially substituting multiple 
expenditure targets for the single one represented 
by the SGR mechanism.17 The approach we 
recommend would rely more on targeting 
reductions to specific services than relying on 
target-generated across-the-board reductions for 
large numbers of services. We consider our 
approach less arbitrary and sounder than across-
the-board cuts but also more difficult to 
implement. One could combine the two 
approaches by first reducing overpriced services 
and then relying on expenditure targets if there is 
any residual overspending compared to targets. 
Nevertheless, this targeting approach is likely to 
generate fewer savings than under an 
aggressive—and actually implemented—
expenditure target approach. Accordingly, we 
assume about half the savings—$80.0 billion over 
10 years—than CBO assumed in their analysis of 
a new service-specific expenditure target policy to 
replace the SGR.  
Reducing Medicare Payment Rates to Hospitals 
and Post-Acute Care Providers   
The Obama administration has made proposals for 
reducing Medicare provider payments to help 
finance health reform. One proposal is to reduce 
the update factor for hospitals and patient 
payments under Medicare by 1.0 percentage 
point. Medicare adjusts its rates under its 
prospective payment systems to acute care 
hospitals each year. Payments are made on a per 
case basis using Medicare’s diagnostic-related 
group system. The update factor is based on the 
projected increase in the costs of labor and 
equipment hospitals purchases. It is essentially an 
adjustment for inflation. MedPAC argues that the 
annual update factor overcompensates hospitals 
because it ignores productivity gains that occur in 
part because of the Medicare payment system.18 
CBO estimates this would save $92.9 billion 
between 2010 and 2019.19  
A second option is reducing the update factor 
for payments to providers for post-acute care 
under Medicare by 1.0 percentage point. CBO 
also estimated the impact of reducing the update 
factor by 1.0 percentage points for payments to 
nursing facilities, home health agencies, long-term 
care hospitals, and rehabilitation facilities. All of 
these are paid through prospective payment 
systems with rates adjusted each year to adjust for 
increases in input costs. An analysis done by the 
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 MedPAC concluded that Medicare payments for 
post-acute care services were too high relative to 
provider costs. MedPAC recommended that 
payment rates for all types of post-acute care 
providers be reduced and that this would improve 
provider efficiency without harm to Medicare 
beneficiaries.20 CBO estimated that reducing the 
update factor would save $54.2 billion between 
2010 and 2019.21  
Reducing the Amount of Safety Net Funds 
 Hadley et al. estimated that the uninsured 
received approximately $56 billion in 
uncompensated care while uninsured in 2008.22 
Further, government programs financed about 75 
percent of uncompensated care or $42.0 billion. 
Some of these funds could be reallocated to help 
finance coverage. If the primary purpose of these 
funds is to support uncompensated care to the 
uninsured, and there are fewer uninsured 
remaining it is hard to justify the use of these 
funds for the same purposes; thus these dollars 
could be reallocated. Hadley and colleagues 
estimated that, through Medicaid disproportionate 
share hospital (DSH) payments, the federal 
government contributed $8.6 billion to hospitals 
and contributed another $12.2 billion through 
supplemental provider payments. These payments 
exclude the DSH expenditures and supplemental 
payments that go to mental hospitals, nursing 
homes, and other nonhospital providers. The 
supplemental payment expenditures were largely 
offset by Medicaid underpayments. Net of these 
underpayments, the amount spent on the 
uninsured from Medicaid DSH, and supplemental 
payment programs was $9.6 billion in 2008.  
The Medicare program also subsidizes 
uncompensated care through its own DSH 
program and indirect medical education hospital 
payments. Medicare’s DSH payments are added 
to the payment rate for hospitals that treat a large 
number of poor patients. MedPAC has shown that 
these payments are only loosely tied to hospital 
costs.23 While they are intended to help hospitals 
with low income patients, they are distributed 
much more broadly across hospitals than is 
hospital uncompensated care. We estimated that 
half of Medicare DSH payments, $5.1 billion in 
2008, actually supported uncompensated care. 
Similarly, Medicare’s indirect medical education 
(IME) adjustment provides some indirect support 
to uncompensated care because teaching hospitals 
provide a large amount of care to the poor. But 
MedPAC has also shown that much of this 
spending does not support care to the uninsured. 
Based on MedPAC estimates, we assumed that 
one-third of IME payments, $2.1 billion in 2008, 
could be attributed to the uninsured.24  
Thus, there was a total of $16.8 billion, 
between Medicare and Medicaid, in federal 
payments that supported care for the uninsured in 
2008. There is an additional amount of state 
payments ($1.3 billion in 2008) in Medicaid. 
There is also $10.6 billion in state and local tax 
appropriations and public assistance that serve the 
uninsured.  
Finally, there are other federal programs such 
as the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the 
Indian Health Service, and community health 
centers that provide care to the uninsured. We 
estimated the share of these programs’ spending 
that provides acute care to the uninsured as 
opposed to being directed to other purposes. We 
estimated that $8.8 billion was used to provide 
care to the uninsured in 2008. If we assume 25 
percent of this amount could be redirected, that 
would add another $2.2 billion.  
Thus, we estimate that $19.0 billion in federal 
dollars could be reallocated to support income-
related subsidies to lower income people. When 
we adjust the $19.0 billion to 2010 dollars, we 
derive a one-year estimate of $21.0 billion. Over 
the 10 year period we estimate that $264.1 billion 
could be reallocated. This would leave states with 
$17.2 billion they now devote to uncompensated 
care25 ($230 billion over 10 years) which could be 
used to support any remaining uncompensated 
care left in the system because of failure to reach 
certain individuals and to care for undocumented 
immigrants. This is in addition to remaining 
federal funds supporting community-based care. 
States would also receive considerable financial 
relief to their safety net systems through the 
federal income-related subsidies provided through 
health reform. 
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 Delivery System Reforms 
Chronic Care Management and Coordination 
It has been well documented that individuals with 
multiple chronic conditions generate a highly 
disproportionate amount of health spending. This 
is true not only in Medicare but for Medicaid and 
for commercial health plans as well. Further, the 
share of health care spending associated with 
those with chronic diseases is increasing over 
time. In 1987, 31 percent of Medicare 
beneficiaries received treatment for five or more 
conditions, accounting for about half of total 
spending. Fifteen years later, more than half of 
Medicare beneficiaries were treated for five or 
more conditions, accounting for 75 percent of 
total spending. Virtually all of Medicare’s 
spending growth in that period could be traced to 
spending for this subpopulation of Medicare 
beneficiaries.26  
Medicaid also bears enormous costs 
attributable to its chronically ill enrollee 
population. Most of these individuals are eligible 
for both Medicare and Medicaid, the dual 
eligibles. There were 7 million Medicaid enrollees 
in 2005 that received full Medicare benefits, 
accounting for about one-seventh of the Medicaid 
population. This group accounted for $131.9 
billion in 2005 or 46 percent of Medicaid 
spending.27 Elderly dual eligibles were more 
likely than non–dual eligibles to have a diagnosis 
of diabetes, heart disease, lung disease, mental 
illness and Alzheimer’s disease. Nonelderly duals 
were more likely to have diagnoses of mental 
illness and mental retardation. 
  Unfortunately a range of interventions using 
various approaches to chronic care coordination 
and care management tested in Medicare 
demonstrations have not been successful in 
producing sustained spending reductions, 
although many did improve quality and patient 
experience with care.28 However, recently, 
Randall Brown, using evidence from Medicare 
demonstrations, suggests particular approaches 
that if seriously pursued offer real cost savings 
potential.29  
Brown suggests that there are three effective 
cost reducing care coordination models. The first 
is short term transition interventions designed to 
reduce hospital readmissions. It is also possible 
that similar approaches might reduce initial 
hospitalizations, particularly if focused on 
ambulatory sensitive conditions. The current 
evidence is that 20 percent of Medicare patients 
are readmitted within 30 days and 50 percent of 
the patients discharged to their homes have no 
physician care between discharge and 
readmission.30 A developing literature shows that 
particular interventions, including enhanced 
discharge planning, heart failure education, and 
coordination of after care services reduces the rate 
of readmissions. Naylor and colleagues using 
advanced practice nurses and Coleman and 
colleagues using a Care Transitions Intervention 
have demonstrated the effectiveness of this kind 
of intervention using randomized controlled trials 
at a number of different hospitals.31 Various 
combinations of interventions have shown 
decreases in avoidable re-hospitalizations of about 
25 to 40 percent.  
The second model is short term interventions 
providing patient “activation” and self care 
management. These interventions engage patients 
for four to seven weeks in community-based 
programs designed to acclimate them in the 
management of their chronic conditions. 
Randomized controlled trials by Lorig and 
colleagues and by Wheeler have demonstrated 
that such interventions significantly reduce 
hospitalizations and costs over a period of 6 to 21 
months. Lorig’s study showed that treatment 
subjects had one-third fewer hospital stays and 50 
percent fewer hospital days than controls over six 
months.32 Wheeler showed that over a 21 month 
period following the intervention’s completion, 
the treatment group experienced 39 percent fewer 
inpatient days and 43 percent lower inpatient costs 
than controls.33 The interventions enabled patients 
to self manage symptoms/problems, engage in 
activities that maintain function and reduce health 
decline, participate in diagnostic and treatment 
choices and collaborate with their providers.  
The third approach is a subset of models from 
the Medicare Coordinated Care Demonstration 
which showed significant cost reductions. Brown 
argues that there are certain common 
characteristics to the successful demonstrations: 
targeting in-person contact, access to timely 
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 information of hospital admissions and emergency 
room visits, close interaction between care 
coordinators and primary care physicians, and 
emphasis on teaching self management skills. In 
three successful programs hospitalizations were 
reduced 17 to 24 percent and total Medicare costs 
by 10 to 20 percent.  
Providing some corroborating findings, initial 
pilots of Guided Care, an approach that provides 
specially trained registered nurses to primary care 
practices to help with management of patients 
whose chronic care diagnoses suggest that they 
will be high users of care in the upcoming year, 
seem successful. 34 This approach combines care 
management with support for patient self-
management and caregiver support. The 
preliminary findings found double digit reductions 
in hospital days, skilled nursing facility days, 
emergency room visits, and home health 
episodes.35 In summary, the accumulated findings 
from more careful targeting of chronic care 
management interventions provides evidence that 
improved management of chronic illness can yield 
substantial savings.  
We assume that if these interventions were 
adopted on a broad scale, initially for dual 
eligibles in Medicare and Medicaid, substantial 
savings could be achieved. We acknowledge that 
this will require greater commitment and 
coordination between Medicare and state 
Medicaid programs than we have seen 
historically. In 2009 dollars, we estimate that 
Medicaid and Medicare costs for dual eligibles 
will be $271 billion.36 If we assume 5 percent 
savings on the cost of dual eligibles from these 
interventions, excluding the reduction in 
readmissions discussed below, this would yield 
$14.2 billion in 2010; over the 10-year 2010–2019 
period, savings would be about $200.5 billion (see 
table 2). We believe that there would be additional 
savings from adoption of these techniques for 
other populations, but we have not assumed 
additional savings for purposes of this analysis. 
For example, there are over 4 million disabled 
individuals in Medicaid that are not dual eligibles; 
there are large numbers of Medicare beneficiaries 
with multiple chronic conditions that are not dual 
eligibles. Thus, these estimates seem 
conservative. 
Reducing Payments to Hospitals for 
Readmissions within 15 Days 
As discussed in the previous section on chronic 
care management, strategies such as “transition 
care” have proved effective at reliably reducing 
hospital readmissions. The impact is perhaps 
greatest for those with multiple chronic conditions 
but is also likely to affect readmission rates for 
patients with many conditions because of the 
common breakdown in communication involved 
with the transfers of care between hospital staff 
and staff at skilled nursing facilities, home care 
workers, community physicians, family members, 
etc. Researchers have developed the concept of 
“potentially preventable readmissions” – those 
that in many cases may be prevented with proven 
standards of care; not all potentially preventable 
readmissions can be avoided even if hospitals and 
other providers follow best practices, but hospitals 
that adhere to best practices will have lower rates 
of potentially preventable readmissions.37 Rates of 
Medicare readmissions vary significantly across 
hospitals -- hospitals at the 90th percentile have 
twice as high a 15 day readmission rate as those at 
the 10th percentile,38-- suggesting that greater 
attention to the quality of discharge instructions, 
improved communication with patients’ usual 
source of care, and direct follow-up by transition 
nurses can reliably reduce readmission rates and 
their associated high expenses.  
Currently, with some exceptions, Medicare 
pays hospitals an entirely new, full payment for a 
readmission, treating them as new hospital 
admissions, regardless of how soon after the prior 
discharge the admission occurs. Using 2005 
Medicare data, MedPAC estimated that Medicare 
spent $5 billion for cases readmitted within 7 
days, $8 billion for cases readmitted within 15 
days, and $12 billion for cases readmitted within 
30 days.39  
MedPAC and the CBO have estimated cost 
savings from reducing payments to hospitals with 
high 30-day readmission rates. Indeed, the CBO 
has scored potential Medicare savings of nearly 
$10 billion over ten years by reducing payments 
by 20 percent to hospitals with readmission rates 
above the median for a targeted condition or 
procedure.40 
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 The problem with this approach is that 
incentives to reduce readmissions would apply 
only to hospitals near or above the threshold for 
financial penalties, which among other things 
might cause some gaming behavior for hospitals 
near the cut-off threshold. Alternatively, routinely 
reducing payment for readmissions for potentially 
preventable readmissions within 15 days of 
discharge to 60 percent of the usual payment for a 
hospital stay would provide all hospitals an 
incentive to reduce preventable readmissions. 
Payments would be pegged near the variable cost 
of a hospital stay, that is, the share of expenses 
that change in proportion to the direct activity of 
caring for individual patients, rather than the 
average costs, which also cover fixed overhead. 
Fifteen days rather than a longer post-hospital 
period is selected to target the policy to activities 
the hospitals have more control over.  
For two years, hospitals in aggregate would be 
“made whole.” That is, the anticipated savings 
from the reduced payment for readmissions within 
15 days would be put into the base rates for the 
conditions selected as potentially preventable 
readmission conditions. After that, we would 
impose a shared savings formula in which 
hospitals in aggregate would keep 40 percent of 
the savings from reduced readmissions and the 
government would keep 60 percent. To calculate 
potential savings, we use the MedPAC estimate of 
$8 billion in 2005 dollars trended forward. 
Government savings would not be captured in the 
first two years. We assume a 25 percent reduction 
in 15 day readmissions from years 3-10, with the 
government retaining 60 percent of the savings. 
This would provide $14.8 billion in savings over 
the 2010-2019 period. 
Health Spending at the End of Life  
Health care at the end of life is very expensive. 
There is an opportunity to reduce spending 
without having to deny care, even that which 
provides small benefit relative to costs. Between 
27.2 and 30.6 percent of Medicare expenditures in 
a given year were for the 5 percent of 
beneficiaries who died during that year,41 and this 
share of Medicare spending has been quite 
constant over a couple of decades.42 One study 
found that spending for the last 60 days of life 
accounted for 52 percent and that spending for the 
last 30 days accounted for 40 percent of total 
spending for the patient’s last year of life.43 About 
half of spending in the last month was for hospital 
care, and one in five patients die in an intensive 
care unit (ICU). Of those who die in an ICU, their 
average stay was about 13 days.44  
Clearly, most of the spending for patients in 
their last months is inevitable and, in some ways, 
desirable. Spending is appropriately directed to 
patients who are seriously ill, only some of whom 
die. Indeed, studies that focus only on those dying 
often ignore the reality that other patients who 
might have been comparably sick but received 
high intensity, “rescue” care did not die. Further, 
much of the end-of-life spending is not designed 
for rescue, but rather attempts to treat progressive, 
disabling symptoms that require some amount of 
active medical intervention, including 
hospitalization and even intensive care in some 
situations. 
Nevertheless, there is substantial and growing 
evidence that much end of life spending is not 
sought by patients and is counter to patients’ and 
their families’ expressed preferences.45 End of life 
care is also often associated with worse outcomes 
in terms of quality of remaining life.46 A recent 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) conference was 
devoted to the topic of the futility of very 
expensive, end-stage cancer chemotherapy and 
the various reasons for its proliferation, including 
reluctance of health professionals to undertake 
difficult discussions about terminating aggressive 
treatment and the profitability of chemotherapy 
administration to oncologists.47 The IOM 
conference emphasized approaches that would 
result in improved information to patients about 
prognosis and treatment options. Overall, there is 
evidence that patients with various terminal 
conditions may not be well informed about the 
costs and benefits of treatment, and that 
physicians may prescribe treatments known to be 
ineffective.48  
There are several potential options to reduce 
the excess costs of medical care at the end of life, 
while improving the quality of that care. Clearly, 
a move away from a health system dominated by 
single specialty practices and toward one centered 
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 on integrated delivery systems could provide the 
mix of professional skill sets and perspectives that 
would facilitate a more patient-centered approach 
to end-of-life care options. 
But progress can be made even in the absence 
of a major reorganization of health care delivery. 
Currently, hospital palliative care teams and units 
have been shown to improve pain management 
and physical symptoms as well as family 
satisfaction with the care their loved one is 
receiving.49 Although access to palliative care has 
increased substantially over recent years, its 
availability can be further encouraged through 
broader deployment, which can be promoted 
through basic reimbursement for palliative care 
activities. Additionally, while hospice is covered 
by Medicare, there is evidence that it is more 
accessible in some geographic regions than others. 
In addition, there is significant evidence that 
hospice is brought into care too late to have its 
maximal benefit—with services often being 
initiated within the last few days of life.50 
Encouraging providers to discuss hospice earlier 
and working to standardize access geographically 
could increase use.  
Several studies have examined the cost 
savings associated with palliative care use, earlier 
and improved end-of-life discussions with patients 
and their families, greater use of “ethics” 
consultations, and earlier referral for hospice 
use.51 Studies have also found that the use of 
hospice and other palliative care is not associated 
with shorter life expectancy, and is in some cases 
associated with longer survival times, suggesting 
that savings are not due to rationing of care.52 
Finally, reimbursement and aspects of practice, 
such as consent forms, should be altered to 
encourage physicians to discuss end of life care 
with patients earlier in the treatment process and 
to provide more forthcoming assessments of risks 
and benefits of continued treatment.  
The last year of life costs represents more than 
25 percent of Medicare spending. We estimate 
significant savings from modest approaches to 
alter clinical decisions for patients at the end of 
life. A 5 percent reduction in end of life costs 
would save Medicare 1.25 percent. This would 
amount to $6.4 billion in 2010 and $90.8 billion 
over 10 years. There would likely be savings to 
Medicaid as well which we do not include here. 
There are also potential savings for younger 
patients as well, but these are probably much 
smaller – there are relatively fewer affected 
patients and an understandably greater willingness 
to spend aggressively on younger patients 
compared to what informed, aged Medicare 
patients want for themselves.  
Prevention of Diabetes and Hypertension 
The burden of preventable chronic diseases—for 
example, type 2 diabetes, hypertension, coronary 
artery disease, kidney disease, and stroke—on the 
health care system is well known.53 Since diabetes 
and hypertension are clinical precursors of more 
serious and more costly conditions, primary 
prevention activities targeted at these “entry-
level” diseases are the most likely to have long-
lasting positive effects on health and reduce health 
care spending. We estimate that uncomplicated 
cases of diabetes and hypertension will account 
for $129 billion in medical expenditures in 2009. 
When the costs of stroke, heart and renal disease 
are added, these expenditures will likely be more 
than $430 billion.54 Analyses of the effect of 
disease reduction on medical costs suggest that, 
on average, a prevented case of diabetes or 
hypertension without heart/stroke/kidney 
complications would reduce average annual 
spending on that adult by 11 percent and reduced 
complications that would otherwise result from 
these diseases would reduce spending by another 
25.6 percent.55  
It has also been demonstrated that, if 
addressed early enough, prevention of these first 
stage diseases can be relatively straightforward 
and does not need to involve expensive clinical 
intervention. Increased physical activity, 
improved nutrition, and smoking cessation have 
been shown to greatly reduce both diabetes and 
hypertension disease risks. 
Previous analyses have expressed skepticism 
about the cost-effectiveness of some disease 
prevention strategies.56 While there are many 
examples of approaches that do not result in cost 
savings, these reviews identify several factors that 
are likely to lead to savings from prevention. As 
noted by the CBO, “Certain types of preventive 
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues   10 
 services have been found to yield substantial net 
savings, largely because the initial costs are low 
and the long-term benefits are large.”57  
In particular, prevention needs to be well 
targeted at a population at high risk of developing 
chronic disease. Second, interventions that require 
expensive clinical and pharmaceutical inputs (e.g., 
widespread use of cholesterol lowering drugs, and 
the use of routine colonoscopies to screen for 
cancer) are often very effective and have been 
shown to increase life expectancy, but the high 
cost of these approaches often means that they are 
more expensive than the costs of the diseases they 
avoid. For these types of interventions, it is 
appropriate to prioritize those that improve health 
and prolong life for the lowest net cost.  
Because “disease prevention” includes both 
medical and lifestyle interventions, when taken 
together, the sum of all prevention activities may 
not be cost saving, but there are examples of less 
expensive and better targeted interventions with 
demonstrated effectiveness. Focusing on these 
types of interventions, one example of which we 
describe here, can produce net savings in medical 
spending. While we do not include them in our 
discussion, the effectiveness of lifestyle 
interventions is likely to be heightened by broader 
prevention efforts including social marketing and 
public education, food and restaurant labeling 
requirements, and school-based initiatives to 
promote more physical activity and improved 
nutrition among students. The hugely successful 
public health campaign to reduce smoking serves 
as an example of how coordinated education and 
smoking cessation efforts can change social 
norms and individual behavior. 
Evidence from the Diabetes Prevention 
Program (DPP) has shown that structured lifestyle 
intervention programs targeted at those at highest 
risk of developing diabetes and identified by 
relatively simple diagnostic screening, can reduce 
the incidence rate of diabetes by more than half.58 
The approach, originally designed to be 
implemented in physicians’ offices by medical 
professionals, has been adapted to a community 
setting.59 Trained nonclinicians can direct the 
intervention to groups of individuals in the 
community at a cost that is approximately 12  
percent of the cost of the original DPP 
intervention. This approach is currently the 
subject of a randomized control trial. While long 
term results on disease onset are yet to be 
established, interim measures of behavior 
modification and weight loss are quantitatively 
similar to those achieved by the one-on-one DPP 
approach. Finally, while diabetes is the focus of 
these studies, the weight loss, increased physical 
activity, and improved diet that these 
interventions produce have also been shown to 
reduce blood pressure. Inclusion of sodium intake 
reduction in the diet modification would likely 
produce further reductions in hypertension.  
A national program modeled on this approach 
could use regular contacts with health care 
providers (including, for example, the “Welcome 
to Medicare” visit) and providers’ existing patient 
base with already diagnosed risk factors to 
identify individuals to refer to a structured group 
exercise and nutrition program that would be 
located in existing public spaces (e.g., community 
centers, YMCAs, school gyms, churches). Health 
care providers would receive an incentive 
payment for each at risk individual who enrolls in 
a program, and programs would be reimbursed on 
a per-enrollee per-year basis, with a higher 
payment for first year enrollees when education 
and training require extra resources.  
Based on first year referral and program costs 
of $300 per enrollee and follow-up program costs 
of $150 per enrollee per year, we estimate that the 
program will cost $1.3 billion in the first year, and 
grow to $3.3 and $5.7 billion in years 5 and 10, 
respectively. Analyses of programs of this type 
estimate a 50 percent reduction in diabetes cases 
among participants.60 Based on arguably 
conservative assumptions detailed in the appendix 
to this report (e.g., only 20 percent of those 
referred by a doctor enroll and 25 percent drop out 
each year), we estimate that the net savings of this 
program would be 0.6 percent of personal health 
care expenditures over 10 years. Total savings 
over 10 years would be $191 billion. Based on 
previous estimates that a large portion of the 
burden for these diseases falls on the poor and 
elderly,61 we assume that 75 percent of this, or 
$142.9 billion would be savings to Medicare or 
Medicaid.  
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues   11 
 Health Information Technology (HIT) 
The amount of savings that are possible from the 
widespread adoption of health information 
technology has been broadly debated. The CBO in 
particular has suggested that HIT can potentially 
save money, but that many estimates most likely 
overstate the savings.62 A review of 42 articles by 
RAND researchers suggests significant potential 
savings from the specific elements of HIT. RAND 
estimated annual potential savings of $80 billion 
at 80 percent implementation nationally, with the 
largest savings coming in the inpatient sector -- 
mostly from shorter lengths of stay and increased 
nurse productivity.63 In 2009, $80 billion would 
be approximately 4 percent of personal health 
spending. Another RAND study estimated $77 
billion per year savings attributable to information 
exchange across different providers, facilitated by 
improved ability of different information systems 
to readily communicate with each other, a feature 
known as interoperability.64  
The RAND analysis was criticized by the 
CBO and others because it looked only at studies 
that had positive effects. Further, the RAND 
analysis did not account for the fact that current 
payment incentives constrain the effective use of 
HIT even if the technology was widely adopted. 
Specifically, fee for service is pervasive 
throughout the nation’s health care system. Thus, 
while physicians and hospitals would bear most of 
the cost of the adoption of HIT, they would lose 
revenues to the extent that HIT reduces 
redundancy in the number of unnecessary office 
visits, tests, imaging procedures, and admissions.  
The Veterans Administration has 
demonstrated the potential benefits in both the 
quality of care provided and reduced health 
spending as a result of its more than ten year 
commitment to adoption of many elements of HIT 
strategies throughout the VA system. Electronic 
medical records are available immediately at all 
VA health centers and include all physician notes, 
test results, radiology images and other clinical 
findings. In addition, their HIT system includes 
monitoring of patient outcomes, adherence to best 
practice standards, clinical decision support, 
electronic ordering and drug dispensing facilitated 
with barcodes, and a range of in-home 
technologies that permit electronic transmission of 
patient clinical status. Studies of the VA have 
shown cost reductions of as much as 25 percent 
per patient attributed to the adoption and 
implementation of robust HIT.65 
While we agree with the CBO that the RAND 
research has overestimated the cost savings from 
HIT and do not think one can easily extrapolate 
from savings in a closed system like the VA to the 
broader health care system, we do not believe that 
it is correct to assume that there are no savings. 
As part of health reform, various approaches to 
better aligning incentives between physicians and 
hospitals are likely to be adopted, including the 
use of bundled payments, which provide one 
reimbursement for an entire episode of care. The 
more efficiently the care is delivered, the more the 
providers benefit financially from the bundled 
payments. Hence, bundled payments would create 
stronger incentives for providers to institute HIT 
strategies. In addition, there is renewed interest in 
integrated delivery systems or accountable care 
organizations that would be paid based on a full or 
partial capitation. It is therefore reasonable to 
assume a gradual shift away from current fee for 
service payment models over the ten year budget 
window. Assuming these changes in incentives 
and the formation of larger organizations, the 
likelihood of achieving some savings from HIT 
would be increased. Even within fee for service, it 
is possible to use a combination of regulatory and 
payment incentive approaches to achieve some 
efficiencies from HIT adoption. In addition, the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 (ARRA) has introduced new subsidies to 
spur the adoption of new HIT modalities.  
We conclude that it is difficult to carefully 
estimate the impact on national health spending of 
more widespread adoption of HIT, but that to 
assume no effect is excessively cautious. We 
assume that HIT will bring about no net savings 
for the first four years of our ten year budget 
window because government and providers will 
bear the cost of adoption and implementation, 
which would offset any savings from increased 
efficiencies. But in the last six years of the budget 
period, we assume that there will be savings in 
national health expenditures, i.e., less duplication 
of services, fewer hospitalizations, of 0.5 percent 
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 per year off the baseline. This results in estimated 
savings of $97.0 billion. Because Medicare, 
Medicaid and subsidy costs will be about half of 
personal health spending (excluding long term 
care) after reform, we estimate that half or $48.5 
billion would be savings to Medicare and 
Medicaid. 
Malpractice Reform and Health Care Cost 
Containment 
Reforms of medical liability—"tort reform"—can 
be expected to save close to 1 percent of total 
health spending or health insurance premiums. As 
described below, savings might be achieved in 
three ways: (1) through lower liability premiums, 
(2) by reducing the excessive services of 
“defensive medicine,” and (3) by helping make 
other reforms more effective. Finally, reforming 
liability as part of health reform also adds value 
for patients; successful health reform can offer 
better ways than do liability laws to promote 
patient safety and compensate people who are 
nonetheless injured. 
First, tort reforms save providers money by 
lowering malpractice premiums, which in turn 
lowers the cost of health coverage. Some state tort 
reforms have reduced malpractice payouts66 and 
hence also the associated liability premiums 
charged to medical care providers.67 The biggest 
impact comes from a "cap" on total malpractice 
awards or on their nonmonetary component, that 
is, “pain and suffering.”68 The Congressional 
Budget Office has estimated that implementing 
California-style reforms nationally, most 
importantly a $250,000 cap on non economic 
damage awards would reduce physician liability 
premiums by an average of 25 to 30 percent, more 
in states with weak tort reform than where reform 
is already strong.69 These findings are consistent 
with providers' persistent lobbying for tort 
reforms. 
Changes in provider costs for malpractice 
insurance should thereafter be reflected in lower 
patient charges and hence in health insurance 
premiums.70 The CBO estimate implies a savings 
on malpractice premiums of $7 to $9 billion for 
2007 (most recent data available)—or some 0.3 
percent to 0.4 percent of national health spending 
in that year.71 
Second, malpractice reforms reduce the 
amount of “defensive medicine,” the extra tests 
and procedures that medical providers say that 
they add to reduce the risk of lawsuit or facilitate 
any needed legal defense. Practitioners have long 
reported such wastefulness, as early as the first 
Congressional hearing on malpractice, in 1969.72 
How much have state tort reforms reduced 
defensiveness? The highest peer-reviewed 
estimate is that caps and similar reforms save 
about 4 percent, by cutting hospital spending;73 a 
more recent study found a 3 to 4 percent cut in 
state health care expenditures.74 Most studies, 
however, find savings in the range of 0 to 0.27 
percent of health spending.75 A recent review of 
medical liability pegged the costs of defensive 
medicine at 1 percent of health spending for 
purposes of estimating potential health system 
savings from altered tort reform.76 We consider it 
plausible – and conservative -- that savings from a 
reduction in defensive medicine might equal or 
slightly exceed those on liability premiums, 
perhaps another 0.5 percent of total health 
spending.  
Greater changes might be feasible if defensive 
services were simultaneously targeted by altered 
payment incentives, more effective utilization 
review or in other ways. President Barack Obama 
has suggested willingness to work with physicians 
to reduce defensive practices by creating some 
liability protection for defendants in compliance 
with authoritative guidelines.77 There is logic to 
this position, along with some evidence that 
guidelines can protect against liability, but new 
approaches are needed to improve on 
unsuccessful prior state use of guidelines.78 
Malpractice reforms can interact with other 
measures in practical implementation. For 
example, as just noted, evidence-based medicine 
and other utilization initiatives may help promote 
the hoped-for reductions in defensive practices 
beyond what has previously been observed. 
Simultaneously, tort reform undercuts provider 
resistance to utilization oversight based on 
allegations that any change in accustomed 
practice subjects them to unacceptable legal 
liability. Nevertheless, we assume conservatively 
savings only from a reduction in malpractice 
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 premiums and defensive medicine—or 0.9 percent 
of health care spending. 
A 0.9 percent reduction in all personal health 
spending would create some $19.2 billion in 
public-sector savings in 2010 and about $258.5 
billion over the 2010–2019 period. Public-sector 
spending (Medicare, Medicaid, and subsidies) will 
represent about half of personal health spending. 
We therefore anticipate that the savings from 
malpractice reform would be split between the 
public and private sector; thus there would be 
$129.2 billion in government savings. 
Finally, apart from dollar savings, making tort 
reform part of larger health reform also makes 
changes in liability more positive for patients. It 
thus greatly alters the political-legal context from 
that of prior battles over tort reform. Stand-alone 
tort limits, in contrast, have had a very 
contentious history, starting with mid-1970s 
California reforms.79 Caps and other limits have 
been resisted politically as a mere takeaway of 
patient rights that undercut patient compensation 
and incentives for safety—notably by President 
Obama and other Democrats. Some courts have 
similarly found state caps unconstitutional, 
holding for example that a short-term insurance 
crisis does not justify legislative changes to court-
made liability rules.80 
However, if tort changes help to build 
coalitions for comprehensive health reform, they 
will benefit all patients. People permanently 
injured during medical care would especially 
benefit, as otherwise their injuries might make 
them difficult or impossible to insure, and very 
few now receive liability awards. A system that 
provides nearly universal coverage will ensure 
that individuals do not have to rely upon tort 
awards to finance their medical care. Legislators 
and judges should appreciate these broader public 
benefits.81 Health reform also provides a platform 
for redoubling federal efforts to prevent medical 
injury, which should form part of health reform’s 
promotion of better medical care. The incidence 
of avoidable injury remains unacceptably high, 
despite generations of increasing liability 
pressure. Patient-safety efforts have the potential 
to reduce health spending but, regardless of their 
impact on spending, are important in their own 
right.82 
Increased Health System Reliance on Primary 
Care/Medical Homes  
There is increasing evidence to suggest that health 
systems with relatively high primary care 
physician to specialty ratios and organized around 
primary care as the first point of entry into the 
health care system are associated with higher 
quality and lower costs.83 A major basis for cost 
savings presumably is greater alignment of 
patients with primary care practices as the usual 
sources of care.  
Supported by enhanced financial support for 
after hours care, availability of urgent care 
appointments within hours, active participation of 
the physician with ER decisions, support for more 
real-time communication with patients, continuity 
with the same clinician over time, reliance on the 
medical home for referrals, all supported by a 
robust EMR, models of enhanced primary care 
practice capabilities – encapsulated into the 
concept of the “patient-centered medical home” 
offer promise that an expanded and reinvigorated 
primary care work force would be able to 
decrease reliance on avoidable cost drivers, 
including unnecessary emergency room visits and 
hospitalizations, complications from use of 
multiple medications, and redundant or 
contradictory care recommendations from 
uncoordinated physician care. Advocates also 
emphasize the potential of enhanced primary care 
practices as instrumental in improving care for the 
growing number of patients, particularly in 
Medicare, with multiple chronic conditions and 
limitations of activities of daily living, as 
discussed earlier.84 
At this time we do not assume savings from a 
comprehensive strategy to enhance the primary 
care workforce and provide new organizational 
practice models. The desired commitment to 
expanding the size of the primary care workforce 
– especially physicians – would not necessarily 
pay off in the short term, because of the long pipe 
line needed to educate and train physicians. 
Further, the promise of approaches such as the 
patient-centered medical home need to be 
demonstrated and, if positive, then broadly scaled 
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 to serve the country. We believe a commitment in 
this area would be a prudent investment for the 
long term but would not necessarily produce cost 
savings within the 10-year window for these 
estimates.  
Comparative Effectiveness/ Public and Private 
Payer Coverage of New Technology  
There is growing interest in developing a quasi-
independent, possibly public-private partnership 
entity to perform comparative effectiveness 
analysis not only to better inform clinicians, 
patients, and payers but also to help produce the 
evidence needed for making evidence-based, 
rather than political, decisions. Potential savings 
from more consistent reliance on evidence of 
effectiveness and consideration of costs would 
apply not only to Medicare coverage of new 
technology but that of private payers as well. 
Indeed, it is hard for commercial insurers to not 
cover services for payment unless Medicare has 
come to the same decision. Commercial insurers 
and large self-funded companies have joined in 
calling for a focus on comparative effectiveness.  
The need is evident from Medicare’s 
experience in making coverage decisions. There 
are numerous examples of Medicare’s attempt to 
limit coverage of new technologies that are 
overturned because of political pressure applied 
by Congress. 85, 86 Thus, there are many approvals 
when the evidence on effectiveness is relatively 
weak.87 Many of these coverage decisions have 
had major cost implications and it is questionable 
that the higher expenditures represent good value 
for the program.88 
However, for the purpose of projecting 
savings, we think the uncertainty about the role of 
comparative effectiveness in general and the 
ability of payers to resist covering technology 
lacking evidence of comparatively greater 
effectiveness prevents us from assuming savings. 
Further, although there are examples of costly 
new services that might not be justified, no one 
has systematically looked at the potential for 
system wide cost savings from adopting a 
disciplined, evidence-based approach to covering 
new technology. 
Summary 
Taken together, we estimate that all of the savings 
initiatives described would result in savings over a 
10 year period of about $1.3 trillion. Adding the 
additional private-sector savings leads to system-
wide savings of $1.5 trillion. The largest overall 
savings come from malpractice reform ($258.5 
billion) and from the reallocation of current 
payments to safety net providers ($264.1 billion). 
Reductions in payments to Medicare Advantage 
plans ($133.0 billion) and other Medicare 
providers (reductions in update factors and 
payments for overpriced services) also provide 
substantial savings ($227.1 billion). Finally, we 
estimate that there will be savings from chronic 
disease management for dual eligibles of $200.5 
billion, increased used of HIT of $98.5 billion, 
savings from improving end of life care for 
Medicare beneficiaries of $90.8 billion and 
savings from prevention programs targeted to 
diabetes and hypertension of $192.9 billion. Some 
additional savings from several of these initiatives 
accrue to those with private coverage. 
Savings from the Public Plan Option 
We examine the possible savings from a public 
plan option which competes with private 
insurance plans within the health insurance 
exchange.89 The public plan would be available 
across the nation through the new health insurance 
exchange and would pay providers based upon 
local prices, just as the traditional Medicare 
program does. The public program would abide 
by all insurance market reforms and offer a 
limited set of insurance packages consistent with 
new federal standard benefit guidelines, just as the 
private plans in the exchange would. These plans 
would likely look similar to typical employer-
based insurance packages. The public plan would 
have the same type of administrative structure as 
the traditional Medicare program does today and 
would use the Medicare payment systems, 
although the rates would be set between Medicare 
and average private payment levels. The public 
plan would be financially self-sustaining using 
premium payments made by and on behalf of 
enrollees, just as is the case with private plans.90 
We estimate that considerable savings are 
possible by making a public plan option available 
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 in the health insurance exchange due to somewhat 
lower administrative costs and lower provider 
payment rates that such a plan would use. Savings 
are possible even if the public plan sets rates 
between current Medicare and private plan rates.  
Currently, provider payment rates by commercial 
insurers are about 30 percent above Medicare 
rates on average. We estimate savings from the 
public plan option based upon the health reform 
plan we used to estimate the costs of reform, 
although there are still a large number of 
unknowns related to this approach. Savings will 
depend in large part on how many people enroll in 
a public plan and the level of premiums and 
subsidy structure. It would also depend on how 
attractive the public plan is relative to alternatives, 
that is, whether it is viewed as a plan for low 
income people or whether it will be more broadly 
attractive. These estimates are taken from the 
analysis laid out in Holahan and Blumberg.91  
In order to determine the size of enrollment in 
the public plan and thus the potential savings, we 
first estimate the size of enrollment in the 
exchange, as the public plan would be offered 
exclusively through the exchange. All estimates 
provided here exclude the population below 100 
percent of the FPL from the base, since that 
income group would be enrolled in Medicaid 
coverage. Given the design contours of the 
reform, almost all individuals and families who 
are self employed or working in small firms as 
well as those who have nongroup coverage pre-
reform would enroll through the exchange. We 
assume that about a third of low income people 
who work in larger firms (50 or more workers) 
would enroll in the exchange as well, with the 
share enrolling in the exchange decreasing as 
incomes increase. This occurs because some low 
income workers in large firms could find that the 
subsidies available in the exchange are greater 
than the employer contribution to their coverage, 
but this becomes increasingly less true as incomes 
increase. For those above 400 percent of the FPL 
there is significantly less reason to join the 
exchange and we anticipate that less than 20 
percent of higher income workers in larger firms 
would end up in the exchange. The vast majority 
(90 percent) of low-income previously uninsured 
families will likely obtain coverage through the 
exchange. The share of previously uninsured 
enrolling through the exchange would fall as 
income increases since the exchange subsidies 
become less attractive relative to employer-based 
coverage as income rises. Based on these 
assumptions, we estimate that about 92 million 
Americans would purchase insurance through the 
exchange.  
Of those enrolled in exchange-based coverage, 
the public plan will be most attractive to the 
lowest income enrollees. Because subsidies are 
tied to the premiums for the three lowest cost 
plans, and since the public plan is expected to be 
one of the lowest cost plans, we estimate that 
roughly 70 percent of the low income exchange 
enrollees (those under 200 percent of the federal 
poverty level) would choose the public plan. The 
likelihood of choosing the public plan would fall 
as income increases, down to about a third of 
those with incomes of 400 percent of the poverty 
level and above since higher income people are 
not as price sensitive as are the low-income. The 
result is that roughly half of the total exchange 
population would purchase private plans after 
weighing the somewhat higher premiums in most 
of the private plan offerings against other features, 
i.e. access and service, and about 47 million 
would enroll in coverage through the public plan. 
The public plan would enroll a high share of the 
previously uninsured, about 13 million by our 
estimates,92 and a disproportionate share of those 
who would receive income-related subsidies. 
About 161 million Americans would continue to 
have private coverage (including private 
administration of self funded plans for large 
employers), in contrast to 177 million without 
reform. This includes over 45 million who would 
purchase private coverage through the exchange. 
We next estimated the savings to the federal 
government from providing a public plan option 
in the health insurance exchange, assuming the 
same structure outlined above. All savings 
estimates are presented relative to the government 
cost of the same reform with only private plans 
offered within the insurance exchange. We 
estimated the government savings under two sets 
of assumptions. First, we assumed that the public 
plan would be able to reduce costs by 15 percent 
relative to the base case (the rough equivalent of 
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 Medicare rates plus 20 percent, plus modest 
administrative savings relative to private plans) 
and that the private plans operating within the 
exchange would respond to competition by the 
public plan by reducing their costs by 5 percent 
(through reductions in provider payment rates and 
stronger utilization management). These costs 
savings are then passed on as lower premiums. 
Second, we assumed greater savings potential 
(lower public plan payment rates), with the public 
plan costs 25 percent below the base case 
premium (the rough equivalent of Medicare rates 
plus 10 percent, and modest administrative 
savings relative to private plans) and the private 
exchange plans responding with 15 percent 
savings through rate reductions and stronger care 
management. 
The savings from the public plan are shown in 
table 3. Under the first set of savings assumptions 
and assuming a fully phased-in reform in 2010, 
we estimate that the public plan would save the 
federal government $17.4 billion in 2010 through 
reduced subsidy costs, and approximately $224.1 
billion over the first 10 years after reform. Under 
the more optimistic savings assumptions, we 
estimate that the presence of the public plan 
would save the federal government about $31.0 
billion in 2010, and about $399.8 billion over the 
first 10 years after reform. Total savings shown in 
table 3 include both private and government 
savings. These amount to $412 billion in the first 
option and $788 billion in the second over 10 
years. 
Savings from the public plan are surprisingly 
large because of the structure of low-income 
subsidies. Because individual premium 
contributions are capped at a percentage of family 
income, a change in premium does not translate 
into a change in individual payments for those 
eligible for subsidies—the individual/family 
continues to pay the appropriate fixed percentage 
of their income. Consequently, as the public plan 
lowers premiums for the population covered 
through the exchange, the resulting savings 
among the subsidized population accrue almost 
entirely to the government. The public plan also 
generates additional private savings to 
unsubsidized individuals and employers who 
purchase coverage through the exchange due to 
the availability of lower cost plans. 
Revenue Options 
In addition to or instead of funding health reform 
through cost savings, the United States could 
finance reform with increased revenues. We 
examined a variety of revenue raising options. 
These include the following: 
 
Table 3
Savings from the Public Plana
(billions  of dollars)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2010-2019
Subsidies, No Public Plan 97.6 102.2 107.2 112.8 119.3 126.5 134.5 143.0 152.0 161.6 1,256.6
Savings From Public Plan 
Medicare rates +20 percentb
Government Savings 17.4 18.2 19.1 20.1 21.3 22.6 24.0 25.5 27.1 28.8 224.1
Total Savings 32.0 33.5 35.2 37.0 39.1 41.5 44.1 46.9 49.8 53.0 412.0
Medicare rates +10 percentc
Government Savings 31.0 32.5 34.1 35.9 37.9 40.3 42.8 45.5 48.4 51.4 399.8
Total Savings 61.2 64.1 67.2 70.8 74.8 79.3 84.3 89.7 95.3 101.3 788.0
aMethods for es timating sav ings are described in John Holahan and Linda Blumberg. 2009. “Is the Public Plan Option a Necessary Part of  Health Reform?” Washington, DC: The Urban Inst itute.
bResults in 15% savings on public plan, inc luding adm inistrative cos ts, as well as lower cos ts for private plans.
cResults  in 25% savings on public plan, including administrative costs, as  well as  lower costs for private plans.
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• Caps on the exclusion of employer health 
insurance contributions from taxation: 
We examine two types of limits on the 
employer-based insurance tax subsidy. Both 
would tax employer health insurance 
contributions that exceeded the 75th 
percentile of current premiums, but one 
would index the cap to increase with the 
consumer price index (CPI), while the other 
would use the increase in gross domestic 
product (GDP) as the index. 
• A payroll assessment on employers that can 
be offset by contributions the employers 
make to their workers’ health insurance: 
We estimate revenue from two alternative 
assessments. One would assess employers 4 
percent of total payroll, with a variant that 
would cap the assessment at the social 
security wage base ($106,800 in 2009). The 
second alternative would vary the 
assessment with the level of workers wages. 
• “Sin” taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages, 
cigarettes, and alcohol; and 
• Income tax options: 
 
One option would raise tax rates on 
ordinary income by 1 percentage point. The 
second option would limit the tax rate at 
which itemized deductions reduce taxable 
liability, as proposed by the Obama 
administration, but exempting charitable 
deductions from the limit. The third option 
would apply the Medicare tax to unearned 
income. A fourth option would create a new 
higher marginal tax bracket for those with 
the highest incomes. 
Table 4 provides estimates from these revenue 
options for the 2010 to 2019 period. 
Capping the Exclusion of Employer 
Contributions to Health Insurance from 
Taxation   
Capping the current tax exclusion of employer 
contributions to employee health insurance has 
been suggested as a way to raise revenue to help 
finance health reform. The exclusion reduces 
federal tax revenues by an estimated $246 billion 
annually in 2007.93 The current tax exclusion has 
several problems. It is highly regressive, it 
contributes to high and rising health care costs, 
and it costs the federal government a substantial 
amount of money. Burman has estimated that the 
reduction in federal tax revenues because of the 
exclusion between 2010 and 2019 is $3.5 
trillion.94 Eliminating the exclusion entirely would 
generate a large amount of money but could 
significantly decrease the number of employers 
offering health insurance to their workers and 
could be highly disruptive to insurance markets. 
Placing a cap on the exclusion may be much more 
politically feasible than eliminating it, primarily 
because it would have less of an impact on the 
current employer-based insurance market.  
Clemans, Zuckerman, and Williams used the 
Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 
Microsimulation Model to estimate the impact of 
capping the tax exclusion in several alternative 
ways.95 They provide estimates of the revenues 
from capping the tax exclusion over the 10-year 
period 2010–2019—at the median and 75th 
percentile of premiums, with four alternative 
indexing options applied to each. These include 
no growth (unindexed), a cap based on the 
consumer price index (CPI), a cap based on the 
growth in gross domestic product (GDP), and a 
cap based on the rate of growth in national health 
expenditures.  
In this paper we use two alternative estimates 
from Clemens, Zuckerman, and Williams. Both 
would cap the exclusion at the 75th percentile of 
premiums, which would limit the immediate 
effect on the employer-based system. (The 75th 
percentile in 2009 is estimated to be $5,346 and 
$12,696 for single and family policies, 
respectively.) We use the estimates that index the 
exclusion by the CPI and, alternatively, by GDP. 
The former would increase tax revenues of $722 
billion over 10 years, the latter $354 billion. Of 
these increases, $456 billion and $224 billion are 
increases in income tax revenues, which could be 
used to help finance health reform. The 
differences between the two sets of numbers  
 
 Table 4
Revenue Options
(billions  of dollars)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2010-2019
Cap on exclusion for ESI at the 75th percentile
-Indexed to CPI, income tax revenue 6.6 11.3 18.7 26.6 35.6 45.6 57.0 69.3 84.5 101.0 456.2
-Indexed to CPI, income and payroll tax revenue 11.1 18.5 30.4 42.9 57.0 72.6 90.4 109.3 132.6 157.6 722.4
-Indexed to GDP, income tax revenue 4.8 6.5 9.5 12.4 16.2 20.9 26.6 33.0 42.1 52.1 224.1
-Indexed to GDP, income and payroll tax revenue 8.0 10.6 15.4 19.9 25.8 33.2 42.2 52.0 65.9 81.4 354.3
Employer assessment
-4% payroll tax, no cap 36.6 37.8 39.1 40.5 41.8 43.3 44.7 46.3 47.8 49.5 427.4
-4% payroll tax capped at Social Security wages 26.4 27.3 28.2 29.1 30.1 31.2 32.2 33.3 34.5 35.6 307.9
-Tax rate varies with worker wages, no cap 48.8 50.4 52.2 53.9 55.8 57.7 59.6 61.6 63.7 65.9 569.7
-Tax rate varies with worker wages, capped at Social Security 
wages 33.5 34.6 35.8 37.0 38.3 39.6 40.9 42.3 43.8 45.2 391.1
Sin Taxesa
All Sin Taxes 11.4 14.4 14.4 14.6 14.8 15.0 15.1 15.3 15.6 15.8 146.4
-Sugar-sweetened beverages, add excise tax of 3¢ per 12 oz 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 51.4
-Cigarettes, increase excise tax by $1 per pack, adjusted for 
CHIPRA tax 2.0 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 34.1
-Alcohol, increase excise tax to $16 per proof gallon 4.9 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.7 61.0
Income Tax Options
-Raise all tax rates on ordinary income by 1 percentage pointb 30.3 43.7 50.8 51.8 52.7 53.8 54.8 55.8 56.9 58.0 508.5
-Limit the tax rate at which itemized deductions reduce taxable 
liability for all deductions except charitable contributionsc 0.0 8.3 22.4 23.7 25.6 27.4 29.0 30.6 32.2 33.8 232.9
-Extension of individual share of Medicare tax to cover unearned 
incomed 34.6 36.3 38.1 40 42 44.1 46.3 48.6 51.1 53.6 434.7
-Raise the income tax on ordinary taxeable income over $1 mill ion 
for joint filers and $500,000 for individuals by 5 percentage pointse 16.9 19.0 21.3 21.9 22.5 23.2 23.8 24.5 25.2 25.9 224.3
eCongressional Budget Office, "Budget Options ." February 2007, p. 255. 
a From Congress ional Budget Off ice, "Budget Options Volum e 1: Health Care," December 2008, Chapter 11, p. 192-196. The est imated revenue from cigarette taxes  is adjus ted to account  for increased tobacco taxes  under 
CHIPRA legislation by subtract ing JCT estimated revenue under CHIPRA from baseline revenue estimates (Joint Committee on Taxation, "Es timated Revenue Effects of the Internal Revenue Code Provisions Contained in 
H.R. 2, F iscal Years 2009-2018, As  Amended by the Senate on January 29, 2009."
b The Congressional Budget Off ice, "Budget Options," February 2007, Chapter 3, page 277.
c Base estimates from the Joint Committee on Taxat ion, "Es timated Budget Effects  Of The Revenue Provisions Contained In The President’s F iscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal," 30 March 2009. Estim ates are adjusted to 
retain full deduct ions for charitable contributions by subtracting the weighted average share of total deductions  taken for charitable contributions for taxpayers with over $200,000 in income from 2006 IRS data, Internal 
Revenue Service, "Table 2.1,  Returns with Itemized Deduct ions: Sources  of Incom e, Adjustm ents,  I temized Deductions by  Type, Exempt ions, and Tax I tems, by Size of  adjusted Gross  Income, T ax Year 2006."
dCitizens for T ax Jus tice. 2009. “Progressive Revenue Options to Fund Health Care Reform.” 
 
 
represent payroll tax revenues that are dedicated to 
finance Social Security and Medicare.  
Clemans, Zuckerman, and Williams show that 
the biggest impacts in terms of tax increases would 
be on those in the two highest income quintiles. The 
results show that the lowest-income people will face 
relatively modest increases in taxes. For example, 
those in the fourth and fifth quintiles would face tax 
increases from $1,430 to $1,920 in 2019 for a cap at 
the 75th percentile of premiums indexed by the 
growth in GDP. In contrast, those at the two lowest 
income quintiles would see increases in taxes of 
$550 and $810 respectively. The small effects on 
the lowest income quintile occur because their 
marginal tax rates are substantially lower. There are 
also fewer people affected in these tax brackets 
because fewer have employer sponsored insurance. 
Thus the cap could provide a substantial amount of 
revenue and be quite progressive.  
 
 
There are other distributional issues, however. 
The cap will have a larger effect in higher-cost 
areas, on firms with older workers, and on small 
firms, those for whom premiums tend to be higher. 
These effects, while true, seem to us to be swamped 
by the favorable distributional effects from the cap 
on those in higher tax brackets. In addition, 
depending upon the design choices made, changes 
in health insurance rating under health care reform 
may reduce the increased impact on smaller firms 
and older workers. For example, if rating reforms 
reduce the variation in premiums across workers of 
different ages relative to today, the cap will not hit 
older workers as hard as it otherwise would. If small 
employers can reduce administrative costs by 
purchasing coverage through a health insurance 
exchange, the disproportionate impact of a cap on 
them be will also be lessened.  
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 An Employer Assessment 
One financing option that has received considerable 
attention is an assessment on employers who do not 
provide insurance coverage. Most commonly 
referred to in the context of an employer “pay or 
play” mandate, such an approach places part of the 
health care reform financing responsibility on 
employers. This policy, a version of which has been 
implemented in Massachusetts, imposes an 
assessment on employers, and can be structured as a 
percent of payroll, as a flat amount per worker, or 
another configuration. If an employer offers health 
insurance to its workers, the assessment amount is 
reduced dollar-for-dollar by the amount the 
employer contributes to the workers’ coverage. The 
revenue collected is then used to help finance 
income-related subsidies under the reform.  
Those individuals who do not obtain coverage 
through an employer could do so through a 
purchasing pool or “exchange,” through a public 
program if they are eligible for one, or through 
another private source of coverage that might be 
available. Depending upon their income, they may 
be eligible for premium subsidies when purchasing 
exchange-based coverage. Some also consider the 
employer assessment under “pay or play” to be an 
additional incentive for employers to continue to 
offer health insurance coverage to their workers 
even in the presence of new options for individual 
purchase of insurance. 
The employer assessment could take many 
forms and could be of any size. For example, it 
could be structured as a flat per-worker amount or it 
could be assessed as a percentage of payroll or as a 
payroll tax only applied to Social Security wages 
($106,800 in 2009). One could set the payroll tax 
rate to approximate the share of payroll employers 
offering coverage contribute to their workers’ 
insurance on average. The assessment could vary 
with size and/or average wage of the firm, with 
smaller or lower wage firms paying lower rates, and 
the smallest or newest firms or part-time or seasonal 
workers could be exempted from the tax 
completely. Another alternative is to have the tax 
rate vary with the wage of individual workers, for 
example, by having low assessments on low-wage 
workers, somewhat higher rates on mid-wage 
workers, and the largest rate on high-wage workers.  
Given that any payroll assessment paid by 
employers creates a hiring disincentive and is likely 
to reduce worker wages by commensurate amounts 
over time, the approach that varies with individual 
worker wages reduces the impact of the assessment 
on lower-wage workers’ employment and wages. 
Distributional effects on workers are particularly 
important because the assessment will largely effect 
those employers who currently do not offer health 
insurance coverage—the vast majority of employers 
who offer today will continue to do what they are 
already doing and be unaffected by the change. And 
employers currently not offering coverage tend to 
be smaller and have a lower-wage workforce. 
We estimated the revenue that could be 
generated under two types of employer 
assessments—the first, a 4 percent pay-or-play 
payroll assessment on all firms, and the second, an 
assessment that varies from 2 to 6 percent, 
increasing with the wage of the worker. Both would 
be limited to firms with more than 10 workers. All 
these assessment rates can be considered relatively 
modest, well below the average share of payroll 
devoted to health insurance coverage by employers 
that currently offer insurance to their workers.  
The 4 percent assessment would generate $36.6 
billion in 2010 and $427.4 over the 2010–2019 
period. If the assessment is only applied to Social 
Security wages, it would generate $26.4 billion in 
2010, or $307.9 over the 2010–2019 period. 
Exempting the smallest firms from an assessment 
makes it more politically attractive; however, it 
reduces the revenue potential of the approach since 
the smallest firms are those least likely to offer 
coverage today. 
An employer assessment of 2 percent of wages 
per worker with annualized wages of less than 
$20,000, 4 percent of wages per worker with 
annualized wages of $20,000 to $60,000, and 6 
percent of wages per workers with annualized 
wages of over $60,000, would generate $48.8 
billion in revenue in 2010 and $569.7 billion over 
the 2010–2019 period. Again, firms with fewer than 
10 workers are exempt. If the assessment is only 
applied to Social Security wages, it would raise 
$33.5 billion in 2010 and $391.1 billion over the 
2010–2019 period.  
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 Sin Taxes 
Many policymakers have proposed funding health 
reform with excise taxes on unhealthy products 
such as tobacco, alcohol, and fattening foods, 
commonly referred to as sin taxes.96 The intent of 
this type of excise tax is twofold; to produce 
revenue and to improve health by reducing obesity 
and other behaviors that adversely affect health. 
Excise taxes on unhealthy products are common: in 
2007, the federal government collected $8.4 billion 
in tobacco taxes and $9.3 billion from excise taxes 
on alcohol. 97 States also tax those products—the 
average state tax on cigarettes is now $1.18 per 
pack. Even taxes on junk food are common. 
Nineteen states taxed soft drinks at a higher rate 
than other foods in 2006, and many states also 
applied higher tax rates to snack foods, candy, or 
food products sold in vending machines. 
A major downside of this approach is that excise 
taxes are regressive. Not only do low-income 
families spend a larger share of their income on 
consumption in general—demand for food and 
tobacco is fairly inelastic with respect to income, so 
food or cigarette consumption does not increase in 
proportion to income—but low-income people are 
also more likely to smoke, to drink heavily, and to 
eat larger quantities of junk food.98 However, many 
people find sin taxes more acceptable than other 
regressive taxes, such as a general sales tax, because 
the tax applies only to nonessential items that are 
detrimental to health. The political viability of 
tobacco excise taxes showed clearly in the strong 
bipartisan support for the Children’s Health 
Insurance Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA) passed 
earlier this year, which funded an expansion in 
public insurance with a 62-cents-per-pack increase 
in cigarette taxes and increases in taxes on other 
tobacco products.99 Also, while low-income 
families will spend more on taxes under this 
proposal, they will also be the primary beneficiaries 
of the Medicaid expansion and income-related 
subsidies under health reform.100 
Our estimates of revenues from these taxes 
derive from those produced by the Joint Committee 
on Taxation (JCT) and used by the CBO, which we 
adjusted to the 2010 to 2019 period.101 The CBO 
estimates account for reduced consumption due to 
the tax increases but assume no savings from 
improved health because that effect is uncertain. 
Although obese individuals or those who smoke or 
drink heavily incur higher average health care costs 
in a given year, they also have shorter life 
expectancy. It is unclear how the savings from the 
reduction in treating medical conditions would 
compare to the increased Medicare and Social 
Security expenditures from longer life spans, so we 
exclude both effects.  
The JCT estimates of revenue from tobacco 
taxes predate CHIPRA’s enactment, and thus do not 
account for the higher taxes already used to fund 
Children’s Health Insurance. We account for this by 
subtracting the JCT estimates of revenue from 
CHIPRA from the revenue estimates from excise 
taxes, resulting in around $34 billion in estimated 
revenue from tobacco taxes over the 10-year period. 
We estimate $51 billion in revenue over 10 years 
from a 3 cent tax on every 12 ounces of sugar-
sweetened beverage and $61 billion from increasing 
the excise tax on alcohol to $16 per proof gallon 
from the current rates of about $13.50 for distilled 
spirits, $6.40 for beer, and $5.14 for wine.102 
Income Tax Increases 
Another potential financing mechanism is to 
increase income taxes. We examine a one 
percentage point increase in the rate for each tax 
bracket, which would generate $508 billion in 
revenue over 10 years.103 A benefit of this type of 
tax increase is that the burden of the tax would be 
shared across individuals in all income groups. This 
kind of broad tax increase would be less likely to 
face potential political opposition than would a 
narrower increase focused only on high-income 
groups.  
However, an income tax increase across the 
board is also somewhat regressive. A 1.0 percentage 
point rise in tax rates would generate a much higher 
percentage tax increase for taxpayers in lower 
brackets than for those in higher brackets. 
Additionally, higher-income taxpayers are more 
likely to be subject to the alternative minimum tax 
(AMT), which would not increase under this 
proposal; anyone subject to the AMT would 
therefore experience no increase in tax liability. On 
the other hand, as noted above, a large share of the 
benefits from health reform will go to lower-income 
groups.  
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 Another proposal would limit the tax benefit of 
itemized deductions to 28 percent, as proposed in 
President Obama’s 2010 budget. This proposal 
would be extremely progressive, as it would affect 
only taxpayers in tax brackets above 28 percent—in 
2009, an individual earning more than about 
$180,000 or a married couple with two children 
earning at least $235,000 per year.104 Only a tenth 
of 1 percent of the revenue generated under this tax 
would come from tax filers earning less than 
$200,000, and more than 65 percent of the tax 
would be paid by filers earning over $1 million in 
income a year.105 When proposed by the Obama 
administration, this option was met with strong 
opposition, partly due to its potential negative 
consequences on charitable contributions.106 
Therefore, the option we model would not limit the 
value of deductions for charitable contributions.107 
Applied to all other itemized deductions, the tax 
would generate roughly $233 billion over 10 years.  
A third option would be to expand the worker 
portion of the Medicare tax to all adjusted gross 
income. Currently the 1.45 percent tax applies only 
to wages, and this approach would apply it 
equivalently to unearned income as well, with the 
increased revenue being used to help finance health 
care reform. According to the Center for Tax 
Justice, this expansion would raise $34.6 billion in 
2010 and $434.7 billion over the 10 year period.108  
Finally, there have been discussions recently of 
increasing marginal tax rates on very high income 
individuals and families. One option is to introduce 
a new income tax bracket, higher by 5 percentage 
points, for individuals with ordinary taxable income 
of $500,000 for individuals and $1 million for joint 
filers. This would create a top marginal rate of 44.5 
percent, assuming the expiration of the Bush tax 
cuts. Such a tax increase would raise $224.3 billion 
over 10 years; substantially more could be raised if 
the income thresholds were lowered.  
Summary of Revenue Options 
These revenue options provide substantial amounts 
of money to support health reform. The cap on the 
exclusion at the 75th percentile of premiums indexed 
to grow at GDP would yield $224.1 billion in 
income taxes (an additional $130 billion in revenue 
would be devoted to the Social Security and 
Medicare systems as a result of this change). The 
employer assessment with the tax rate that varies 
with worker wages capped at the Social Security 
wage base will yield another $391 billion. The three 
alternative sin taxes would yield $146 billion. 
Limiting the itemized deductions for the top two 
brackets for all deductions except charitable 
contributions would yield $233 billion.  
Raising marginal tax rates on ordinary income 
by 1 percentage point would yield $509 billion over 
10 years. The latter option would seem to be 
politically difficult except for the fact that the 
system savings from the variety of provisions we 
have discussed would yield far more than the 
amount raised by a 1 percentage point increase in 
income tax rates. That is, the amount that most 
individuals would save from system reforms would 
be greater than the new taxes they would face. 
Other options included here would shift much of the 
tax burden to the highest-income people. While 
perhaps politically attractive to some, it is also at 
odds with the way other nations finance public 
health insurance, through broad-based payroll or 
consumption taxes. Taken together, these revenue 
sources could provide much more in new revenues 
over 10 years than would be needed, but obviously 
require difficult choices. 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown that there are a variety of 
ways to raise money to pay for health reform. The 
essential results are summarized in table 5. These 
include selectively reducing Medicare 
reimbursement rates and adopting a variety of 
system reforms, introducing caps on malpractice 
liabilities, reallocating funds now devoted to the 
safety net, and adopting a public plan. Also, we 
examined a range of options for increasing 
revenues. There are a variety of combinations of 
these options that would yield more than enough 
money to pay for the prototypical health reform 
plan that we have outlined.  
We estimate that health reform measures that 
we have discussed could save the government close 
to $1.3 billion. These measures include reducing the 
payment differential for Medicare Advantage 
programs, reducing payments for overpriced 
physician services, and reducing update factors for 
inpatient hospital care and post-acute care. 
Together, these payment reductions would provide 
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 savings of over $350 billion. Reallocating some of 
the dollars that now pay for the uninsured through 
payments to safety net providers, both hospitals and 
clinics, could yield another $264.1 billion. This 
assumes universal coverage, that care for 
undocumented immigrants would be a state and 
local responsibility, and that current state and local 
expenditures could be reallocated for this purpose. 
Modest savings to the private sector would also 
result from these initiatives.  
Next we make estimates for measures where 
savings estimates are more controversial. Making 
what we believe to be conservative assumptions, we 
estimate savings of $200 billion savings from 
management of chronic care for dual eligibles in 
Medicare and Medicaid and $92 billion from 
improving the management of end-of-life care for 
Medicare beneficiaries. We suggest a prevention 
initiative that could save $191 billion and estimate 
savings of $97 billion from increased use of health 
information technology (HIT). We estimate that 75 
percent of the savings from the prevention initiative 
and 50 percent of the savings from increased HIT 
used would lower government costs. Medical 
malpractice reform would yield another $258 
billion, with half lowering costs to the government. 
Introducing a competitive public plan would 
provide savings to the government of between 
$224.1 billion and $399.8 billion. The difference 
depends on how Medicare rates are set. Significant 
private savings would also accrue to individuals not 
eligible for subsidies.  
We also examine a variety of revenue options. 
A cap on the exclusion of employer-sponsored 
insurance could provide savings from $224.1 billion 
to $456.2 billion depending on whether the cap is 
indexed to GDP or the CPI. We recognize that a cap 
on the exclusion could have stronger effects on 
high-cost areas, on firms with large numbers of 
older workers, and small firms. But, in general, the 
distributional effects are progressive. We examine a 
variety of ways of placing an assessment on 
employers who do not provide insurance to their 
workers and estimate revenue of between $308 
billion and $570 billion. We recognize that 
employer assessments can be regressive and can 
have adverse effects on worker wages and 
unemployment. Imposing a variety of sin taxes, 
including taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages, 
cigarettes, and alcohol could yield $146.4 billion. 
Sin taxes are also regressive but we argue that the 
benefits from health reform are quite progressive 
and counterbalance such regressivity. 
Finally, we looked at income tax options. We 
recognize that these are not likely to be popular but 
suggest they may be necessary if all else fails. 
Increasing tax rates on ordinary income by 1 
percentage point would yield about $500 billion. 
Another alternative is to limit the tax rate at which 
itemized reductions reduce taxable liability but 
retain the full reduction for charitable contributions; 
this would yield $233 billion. Imposing a Medicare 
tax on unearned income and using the proceeds to 
pay for health reform would yield $435 billion. A 
higher tax on very high earners would yield $224.3 
billion. 
The main conclusion is that it is clearly possible 
to finance health reform but doing so requires 
difficult trade-offs. The fewer savings initiatives 
adopted, the more other measures must be relied 
upon. If the skepticism over savings from 
prevention, HIT, or reforms to end-of-life care 
prevails then it becomes more difficult to achieve 
savings without a public plan. Without reliance on 
the public plan it becomes more necessary to use 
such revenue measures as the cap on the ESI 
exclusion, an employer assessment or increases in 
income taxes, or limits on deductions. An 
unwillingness to reallocate safety net dollars or to 
enact malpractice reforms and inability to obtain 
“scorable” savings from the CBO on other measures 
makes it more imperative that the public plan be 
adopted. Finally and obviously, the more funds that 
can be taken out of the current system, the less the 
need there is to rely on new revenue sources. 
Alternatively, if there is little political appetite for 
new taxes, then stronger cost-containment measures 
and the adoption of the public plan will be essential.
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 Table 5
Paying for Health Reform
(billions  of dollars)
Medicaid Expansion (Net) 550.4
Subsidies, No Public Plan 1,256.6
Total Reform Spending 1,807.1
Establish Competitive Bidding for Medicare Advantage Programb 133.0 133.0
Savings from Reduction in Payments for Overpriced Services 80.0 80.0 *
Reductions in Other Medicare Payments
-Reduce Update Factor for Hospitals ’ Inpatient Operating Paymentsc 92.9 92.9
-Reduce Update Factor for Payments to Post-Acute Care Providersc ` `
Reallocation of  Safety Net Funds 264.1 264.1
Total 570.0 570.0
Delivery System Reforms
Savings From Chronic Disease Management for Dual Eligibles 200.5 200.5 *
Savings from Reducing Hospital Readmissions in Medicare and Medicaid 14.8 14.8
Savings from Improvements to End of Life Care for Medicare Beneficiaries 90.8 90.8
Savings from Prevention to Medicare and Medicaid, or Subsidy Cost 142.9 191.0
Savings from Increased Use of HIT to Medicare and Medicaid, or Subsidy Cost 48.5 97.0
Savings from Malpractice Reform to Medicare and Medicaid, or Subsidy Cost 129.2 258.5
Increased Health System Reliance on Primary Care/Medical Homes 0.0 0.0
Comparative Effectiveness/Public and Private Payer Coverage of New Technology 0.0 0.0
Total 626.8 852.6
Public Plan Savings
Savings from Public Plan
Medicare rates +20%d 224.1 412.0
Medicare rates +10%e 399.8 788.0
Revenue Options
Cap on Exclusion for ESI at the 75th Percentile
-Indexed to CPI, income tax revenue 456.2 456.2
-Indexed to CPI, income and payroll tax revenue 722.4 722.4
-Indexed to GDP, income tax revenue 224.1 224.1
-Indexed to GDP, income and payroll tax revenue 354.3 354.3
Employer assessment
-4% payroll tax, capped at Social Security wages 307.9 307.9
-4% payroll tax, no cap 427.4 427.4
-Tax rate varies with worker wages, capped at Social Security wages 391.1 391.1
-Tax rate varies with worker wages, no cap 569.7 569.7
Sin Taxesf
-Sugar-sweetened Beverages, add excise tax of 3¢ per 12 oz 51.4 51.4
-Cigarettes, increase excise tax by $1 per pack, adjusted for CHIPRA tax 34.1 34.1
-Alcohol, increase excise tax to $16 per Proof Gallon 61.0 61.0
Income Tax Options
-Raise all tax rates on ordinary income by 1 percentage pointg 508.5 508.5
-Limit the Tax Rate at which Itemized Deductions Reduce Taxable Liability for All 
Deductions Except Charitable Contributionsh 232.9 232.9
-Extension of individual share of Medicare tax to cover unearned incomei 434.7 434.7
-Raise the income tax on ordinary taxeable income over $1 million for joint filers 
and $500,000 for individuals by 5 percentage pointsj 224.3 224.3
Total Funds for Reform
Highk 3,277.3 3,891.4
Lowl 2,323.6 2,737.3
Cost of Reform Less Estimated Available Funds
Highk -1,470.3 -2,084.3
Lowl -516.5 -930.2
The Cost of Health Reform
2010-2019
Reductions in Payments to Medicare and Medicaid
Government Costs
Government 
Savings Total Savingsa
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 Notes on Table 5
dResults in 15% savings on public plan, inc luding administrat ive cos ts.
eResults in 25% Savings on public plan, including adminis trative costs .
kCongressional Budget Off ice, "Budget Options." February 2007, p. 255 
iCitizens for Tax Justice. 2009. “Progressive R evenue Options to Fund Health Care Reform.”
jHigh es timates of available funds  include all savings from  reductions  in payments to Medicare and Medicaid and delivery system reforms, as well as savings  
from Medicare payment rates +10%; incom e tax revenue from a cap on exclusion for ESI at the 75th percentile,  indexed to the CPI; revenue from an employer 
assessment that varies with worker wages and has no cap; all s in tax revenue; and revenue from  raising all tax rates on ordinary income by 1 percentage 
point.  
lLow es timates of available funds  include all savings from reductions  in payments to Medicare and Medicaid and delivery system reforms, as well as savings  
from Medicare payment rates +20%; incom e tax revenue from a cap on exclusion for ESI at the 75th percentile,  indexed to the GDP; revenue from a 4% 
employer payroll tax, capped at Social Security Wages; all sin tax revenue; and revenue from raising the income tax on ordinary taxeable income over $1 
million for joint  f ilers and $500,000 for individuals by 5 percentage points.   
c The Congressional Budget Office, "Budget Options  Volume 1: Health Care," December 2008, Chapter 7, p. 108-109. Annual es timates com e direc tly from 
CBO for years 2010 to 2014 and for 2010-2019 total.  Other years are es timated to reach total based on previous years and trends (estimates assum e a 
cons tant  third derivat ive of annual savings).
f From Congressional Budget Office, "Budget Options Volume 1: Health Care," December 2008, Chapter 11, p. 192-196. To est imate a tax implem ented in 
2010, a growth rate was calculated from years  2011 to 2013 annual es timates and 2009-2018 total revenue est imate.The first year after implementation is 
calculated by adjust ing the 2009 revenues by this factor (i.e. baseline cigarette tax revenues are adjusted downward, baseline alcohol and beverage tax 
revenues are adjusted upward). The es timated revenue from Cigarette taxes  is adjus ted to account for increased tobacco taxes  under CHIPRA legislation by 
subtract ing JCT estimated revenue under CHIPRA from baseline revenue es timates (Joint Committee on Taxation, "Estimated Revenue Effects  of the Internal 
Revenue Code Provisions  Contained in H.R. 2, Fiscal Years 2009-2018, As Amended by the Senate on January  29, 2009."
g The Congressional Budget Office, "Budget Options," February 2007, Chapter 3, page 277. While CBO estimates were for years  2008 to 2012, the est imates 
shown are the CBO est imates  for 2010 to 2012 (unadjusted) projected out using the average growth rate required to obtain the CBO est imate for total 
revenues from  2008 to 2017.
h Base estimates from the Joint Committee on Taxat ion, "Es timated Budget Effects  Of The Revenue Provisions  Contained In The President’s Fiscal Year 
2010 Budget Proposal," 30 March 2009. Estim ates are adjusted to retain full deductions for charitable contributions  by subtracting the weighted average share 
of total deduct ions taken for charitable contribut ions for taxpayers  with over $200,000 in incom e from 2006 IRS data, Internal Revenue Serv ice, "Table 2.1, 
Returns with Itemized Deduct ions: Sources  of Income, Adjustments, I temized Deduc tions by Type, Exem ptions, and Tax I tems, by Size of adjusted Gross  
Income, Tax Year 2006."
b Ten year estimate from Congress ional Budget Off ice. Information on the Options  for the Medicare Advantage Program’s  Benchmarks for F ederal Paym ents . 
Letter to the Honorable Mike Crapo. 2009 May 18. Individual year es timates were derived using the predicted growth rate of Medicare, assuming a three year 
phase-in period.
*Addit ional savings to the privately insured were not es timated.
a Total savings include sav ings to the government, as  well as  those that accrue to indiv iduals with private health insurance coverage. 
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 APPENDIX 
Description of a Diabetes and Hypertension Prevention Program 
 
We assume a small incentive payment ($50) to physicians or other providers who successfully refer patients 
identified as “pre-diabetic” to a group program delivered at a community center, or private facility (the 
demonstration program is delivered at YMCA facilities). The provider of the group program would be paid 
a fee for each participant who enrolls in the initial sessions ($250) and further payments if the participant 
continues the program in subsequent years ($150). 
We assumed that 50 percent of the pre-diabetic population, estimated to be 57 million in 2007,109 could 
be identified and referred through regular contact with a health care provider. We limit the potential target 
population to 76 percent of persons living in urbanized areas and in central places of urban clusters (as 
defined by the US Census bureau). We assume that 20 percent of the referred population would enroll 
initially. While long-term follow-up studies of clinical trial participants have yet to be completed, the 
effectiveness of lifestyle interventions in reducing body weight and increasing physical activity has been 
shown to persist for at least 4 years.110 However, because we do not expect lifetime adherence to lifestyle 
modification, we assume that 25 percent of enrollees would drop out every year. 
Based on results from the DPP, we estimate that approximately 10 percent of pre-diabetics develop full 
diabetes within a year, but a systematic review of randomized clinical trials of lifestyle interventions 
estimates that this incidence rate could be reduced by 50 percent for program participants as long as they 
stay in the program.111 We assume that the onset of hypertension responds to similar behavior modification 
(diet and exercise) in a similar way. Since approximately 40 percent of persons with diabetes or 
hypertension develop heart disease within five years, we assume that 40 percent of prevented cases of 
diabetes and hypertension will also prevent cases of more serious conditions five years after the initial 
effect. We assume that no disease prevention effect occurs before the second year. 
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